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EDrnRS NOTE
Arthur Wwkow is the a u k of Tbe Limits of Dejmst,* a critical s d y
of t b e various policies of deterrence held in the Department of Dcfense. The
bwk also p r o p e s a form of disarmament which, in Waskow's words, "would
advance liberty in the world" white providing a genuine security. Waskow, a
fret-lance writer and former congesshal: legislative assistant, is a g d u a t e
student in American history a t the U n i e t y of W i i o d n , now completing
his dkertarion on race riots. He is one af the authors in the American Friends
Service Committee's sndy series, "Beyond Deterrence"
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on arnk 12, President M
y p r o d u r guid.
policy the slogan "Neither Red nor dud.'* Yet t
k civil defense
progrvn he strongly supports is the one d v a b l e program thnt could rcntlt
in America's being both dead and Red.
Most critic& of tbe propwed civil defense program have not looked at
it in ternur of deimate goals. The criticisms have f o c d on minor questions
of technique and have frequently been contradictory. Critics have argued
that the p r o p is tw small, that it should include k t shelter8 as well os
f&ut s b h , that ie depends too much on home shelters and too little on
cornmunit). shelters, that it depends rim much on community h e l m and
too littIe on home shelters, that it haves foe much power to the states, that
it hns granted too much power to the D e f m Department, that it bas stirred
up mch hysteria tbat some Axnericans are preparing to kill other Ameriuna
in the name of civil defense and that it h a not stirred up enough excitement
t o banish the
apathy and indaerence to civil defense.
But none of these criticism has gone to the real root of the trouble. The
real trouble with civil defenge is that it will not work by the standards the
President set up. To use his slogan as a benchmark by which to judge the
civil defense program, its terms might be d & d this way: "dead" to mean
that all Americans would be dead wit& one year from the date t h a t a
thermonuclear war began, ond "Red" to mean thnt American free enterprise,
free speech and free elections had been wiped wt by an d-powerful c e n d

I n No*

to American

government.
Tf a civil defense program were to make R h c s s and deadness IesP k l y
fates for America, the program would be worthy of support; if civil defense
were t o make either of these fates kss U d y a t the price of making the other
more likely, the program would require the most serious, soul-searching reclumination, and if civil defense could be shown to make both Redness d
deadness more IikeIy fates for America, then civil defense ought certainly to

be rejected out of hand
To app& civil defense intelligentIy therefore m p h an amination of
the effects a civil defense program would bave upon the likelihood of thermonuclear war; upon the kind, size, and survivability of a thetmonucIear war
if it did come, and upon American free enterprise and political liberty.
Civil Defense as D~llnge~
to Peace
Since 1958 there h
s been a stntggIe inside the Pentagon between two opp o d views of what American mihary strategy should be. Growing logically
out of the two d t a r y strategies are two opposed views concerning civd
deft-ne that civil dcfcnse is a necessary part of the American military
posture, and the other that civil defensc might endanger the stability of
America's deterrent to Swict attack. Let u.9 examine these two strategies and
their imnIicatiom.
.
The &st of these strategies is held mostly (tbough not erclusirely) by
oficers of tbe Air Force. It is based on the belief tbat a controUcd, "lirnitEd"
thmmonuchar war is possible. Its advocates are often called "counter-fore"
strategists, because they believe that any nation would use its H-bombs
against its enemy's military forces rather than agilinse enemy pplations.

They Mieve that Russian miss& and bombers would k used mostly to attack hmicm misaile and hm&r bases, mthw tb;m large American citk,
and that Amuica's a d c strength would lx used in tk s a m e way a g d
the Rrrssiana Counter-force strategists believe that ehermonuclcar war w d
be very much *old-fashioned,
nineteenth-century war, in which every
nation deliberately left its enemy's governmat and the bullc of his popu2atwn
b,
in order t o have a government with which to negotiate terms of p e a ~ e
and a &g d t p fiom which to extract indemnities or &tory. The
couuter-force view of war is thus &at of two military forces duelling wbile
the rest of both zutiom watch and wait.
Counter-force strategy n e e d y assumes that military forces and the
rest of the population are really separad from each other, so that an attack
on forcei will not badly damage the population. The cnomous poww of the
H-bomb makes essential not only a physical and geographical separation between forces and populations, but protection of the civilian populationt by
r n w of civil defense. That is why counter-force strategists insist upon
civil defense aa a part of the American militay pstum
But what kind of civil defense does rhip mean? Hem supof counterforce strategy disagree, depending upon their idea of how a thermonuclear
war is likely to begin. One view is that such a war would begin with a direct
attack by the Soviet Union upon American bomber and missiIe haw. With
whatever the United States had left, it would retaliate upon Soviet bas- and
so the war would go on, thrust and parry, u n d one side or the other bad
shown its superiority and could demand the enemy's submission. In the meanrime, mast of the American population would baw been waiting out the war
in areas not directly exposed to b h t and fLu. There would have been accidents and &sfwes, and some cities are sa close to imprtant bases that these
cities would have been destroyed But wunter-force strategists calculate that
prhaps no mare than 30,000,000 Americans would have died from direct
attack in this stage. For everyone else, the chief danger w w l d be fallout, and
therefore rhis =hml of counter-force strategists argues for the creation of
ample fabut shelters for the whole American population.
T h e second school of counter-force stracegists argues that thermonuclear
war might well bcgin in anothcr way. They suggest that the

Communists

mighr attack important American inter-# without attacking the United
States itself. For example, the Soviet Union might take over West Berlin ox
mighr invade Western Europe, or China might invade Southeast Asia or the
Chinese and Russian3 together might sponsor a Communist revolution in
South America. In any of these cases, the United States mighr want to be
able to rhreaan the Communists with punishment on their home ground.
Thus the United States might be the h t to use the H-bomb in this kind of
war, &st to knack our Soviet military bases that might otherwise mtaliate,
and then to strike perhaps one or two ppulation centers a a minor punishment for a minor provocation or against o whole series of c i t k to punish
a& a major provocation as invasion of Western Europe.
Probably before taking an action like this the United States would issue
an ultimatum to the Communists to withdraw their pmwative act or s d c r
the consequences. But before issukg such an u l ~ t u m
or firing its h a -

n u c k w w p q the Unitsd Scam w d want to be able to protect its own
population fmm xeprisal. It wodd therefore be mxssq for the government
ro order evacuation of American c i b in order to prevent tbe Russians fmm
h
d
g to d a t e for any alack by an attack on wr large popuIation
centers. It would be necessvp to prorect tbe people king evacuated agPinst
direct H-bomb attack and therefore against 6re and blast as w d as fallout,
The h g e numbers of people invdved would make it necessary co build huge
undergmund cities insulated from firt and bkpt and capable of accommodating large numbers of Amdcans. For t h e e rtzsons, this second school of
ruategisa urges that immediate attention be paid to building b h t shelma
md to m&g mngtmcnts fm *'stmt~gicevac~ation,"mcadng evacuation
more than one day in advance of the expected Soviet am&.
Thus, in rhe hope of freeing American &wry forces to fight a tbermonuclear war more eeectivdy, counter-force stratcgista call for o propm of
civil defense.
Many of the u i d c s of counter-force strategy are ogcera in the A m y and
Navy. They argue that if m y thermonuclear war comes, it cannot possibly
be the "limited" and wntroUcd kind of war that counter-force strategists
expect. They h h t that no nation can survive a thermonuclear war, and that
MOE
American milimry pwer must be so constructed as to deter any
such war from beginning. They beIieve that a stable detcrrcnt---~nethat prevents any nation from striking first-wdd
dew the defense of American
interests by h i d - w a r for- on I d and sea.
Stabledeterrent strategists argue t b r e no themonuef ar war can possibly
be contro1M. Thy argue that once a t h m m & r
war began, the bail of
H-bombs directed agaiast dtq targem wmld destroy communications,
prevent assessment of one%own or the enemy's damage and almost certain1y
brmk down the command -p
tbat pmxme the nation-state itself. Once
the p s i b i t y of mntrol was ht,thermonuclear bombs on bth sides would
be f&g without regard to distinctions between people and military targets.
Moreover, stabledeterrent strategists point out tbat the assumed ggraphical separation of people and forces is impossible to maintain. As missile
bases become more and more numerous, dispexsed, mobile, secret and "hardened" against direct blast (din hopes of making t b m invulnerable to a
&st strike and able to mount a retaliatory strike), the Soviets will be raising
tbe size pnd power of their weapons in an attempt to destroy these more and
more invutnerabie bases. As rbe attacking weapons would grow more and
more powerful, thqr would threaten more and more damage to populations
a t some distance frorn Ground Zero. Thus the Atomic Energy Commission
has calculated that a 100-megaton H-bomb would came a grmt firestorm
over an area larger tban the state of Vermont.
The last criticism of counter-for- strategy is the most serious. By aiming
the attack a t each side's atomic forct~,it w d
a great premium upon
striking first. Whichever nation absorbed the fist attack would have its ability
to retaliate greatly impaired. Both nations will see and understand this, and
in any period of inpolitical crisis each wdI be extremely fearful that tbc
other might decide to s t r h &st, If either nation concludes that the other is
about to st&, the prrssurer to strike first instead will bt enormous.
3

Thw stabbdmrcent straregists fe;u that a counter-fme strategy wwld
t o bring about a preemptive war, and that once the war beg= it
would mount inevitably into a war against popddons as well as forces. Since
t h y fed any daermonuclear war would destroy America, they have tried to
work out ways to deter such a war inst#d of winning it. They feel it b
lutelg nectwzry that both rhe United States and the Soviet Union have every
reason to avoid even the bare p W t y of striking first with thermonuclear
a r m against the ocher and that the United Stares and the Soviet Union each
know that &the 0 t h feels this wav. Advocates of a stable deterrent believe
the systeh will be stabk if both i r e a t powcrs have an extxmely w d p m
tected ability to mount a rttrriiatory thermonuclear strike against the other
(hg.,Pokrir tdmwhw) and if both powers a t the same t h e have no pt+
tection for their populations, industries and governments. The theory is that
in tbis state of affairs neither nation would be willing to use its striking force
&st, out of fear of overwhelming retaliation that would destroy its whole
society. But, on the orher hand, ePeh nation would b willing to rtrike second
since an attack upon it would so nwly destroy the country that mthing
worse c o d d be expected in return for mounting an attack upon the aggressor.
Thus both naeiom would be p n n r s e d that the other would never inten-

be M y

tionally strike first.
fngicauy, accepting this Strategy woutd mcan that the United Stat&- and
the Soviet Union ought not to have any civil defense at all. Both mtiws
would be publicly announcing their knowledge that thermonuclear war
would mean total destruction for their own mcuty, Both nations, by basing
their strategies on this knowledge, would bt offering ttKi entire -populations
as hostages to

prevent thmmonuclear war.

There is a second element in atable-demrcne thinking rbae would work
against having civil defeme. Acceptance of the thermonuchr rtalernate
would makc it necessary for the United Statw to strengthen iu limited-war
forces in order to defend its interests mund the ghh, since the thrcat of
thermonuctar punishment could not be used, The necessary mobiIization of
money and men in su6cient amounts to make a limited-war force able to
resist the greater numbers of the Soviet Empire w d make it extremely difficult to build n civil defense system at the same time. For thia xezpon,
strategists who emphasize the need for a limited-war capability are dubious
about the comparative usefulness of civil defense.
The two serategies would have imporcant implications in foreign plicy,
outside the field of purely miIitary affairs. Supporters of counter-force strategy say that civil defensc w d d "stiffenthe national will." By this they mean
that if the United S t a w had a civil defense system in optration, the American
people and government would be more Uely to go to the brink of total war
rather than negotiate in political crises like that over Berlin. Even if civil
defense would not actually prevent national destruction, the M e f of large
segments of the population and government that it would protect l i v e might
force some future administration into a more kUigerent stance.
Thus counter-fore strategy and civil defense go hand in hand with a
brinksf-war foreign policy, while the stable detwrcnt would h d to a foreign plicy more interested in negotiatiw and modention. It would be p-

sible from a stable-deterrent Ation to move in the direction of anm c w t d
or d i m a t , but it wou d be i m p i b l e in ehe counter-force atmosphere
of a constant arms build-up d impding preemptive war to discuss am^
control or &atmarmat dausly.
Deciding for or against civil defem is crucial to choosing ktw- war
a d pace, since there is involved the choice betwem counter-fwce strategy
and the stabIe deterrent. Counter-force strategy leads toward thermonuclear
war without in fact easing the impact of that war u n America. The stable
detunnr, which reqvirr. that no c i d defense be
&era nr last r short
respite in the arms race and the chance of a period of negotiation. For t k
itasons, one major defect of civil defense is that it leads to war.

f

d,

Ciuil Defense rir u Danger to Life
Supporrersof civil defense rwt their case u p n tbe belief that a civil d t f u ~
program could save a number of American lives in case of thermonuclear war.
In examitring that belief, it t m u y to ask first whether civil d e f w
would make a difXerencewhether it w o d in fact save any lives at dland secondly whether civil defense might actually increase the number of
deaths from a rhetmonuclear war. In making thia analysia tht key factors art
what the war and its aftermath would be like and what the civil defense
shelmr system would be like. The interrelation of b two factors would
determine how many would survive a t t a e ~ u c l w
war.
Even a thermonu&ar war that be@ with an attack upon d t a r g bass
is practically sure to degenerate inro a disordered, desperak attack against
the whole nation. Communications wouId surely be one of the &st casuaItiea
of a thermonuclear attack. It w d k exuemefy W a l t even to assess the
damage to American fore- caused by the first strike against us. Missilemen
in one county would probably have no way of discovering whether the m i d e
basw in the next camty are still capable of &ing. To get any c h r picture
of what damage W E have done the enemy w d be enomrously more W c d t
Assuming that an.A m c r i c ~government were still functioning after the h t
attack, it would have to try to give orders without knowing its own surviving
defenses, the power Ieft to its own striking arm or the enemy targets still
requiring theruetion.
In fact, such B government may have great di&cufty in delivering its
orders a t dL Electric wammbion h,
radio towers and telephone instahtiom would all have been knocked out. J d g devices would be used by the
enemy ta prevent orders to fire from reaching their destination. Thtta mall
group of atomically armed forces would be left to make ehtir own decisioar
about how to attack the enemy. Meanwhile, some American cities would
have been destroyed, either because they were roo c h to h i l e bases or becam of inaccuracy in aiming md G n g . Some field commanders would decide to take revenge by aiming their missiles a t enemy cities. Others might
believe from the k 3 situation that the United States had been defeated and
tbat there was no option but mrrender. S d I others, without orders and murounded by h,
might succumb to insane fear and h a d and end up dring
H-bombs at -thing
in sight. The same p m s would be tacoking place on
the eacmy sidc, with tbC d t that a t t a c h would bE deIihtcly motrntcd
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-
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S u m of tbt atta
itl
m piEcOe protected ba=, would have been
mound with 50-mcgawa and 1 0 0 - m p t w bomb&
Tk vmnont4id
. mresultfromatch
b t o r m predicted by & A&
Energy

.

w~~~wldmearrah~in~moss6rewhotthatitw~~
oxygen from iu entire pctimetcr in hurricane-velocity winds and wwld
bum even maferiPLP that am nw n~mrpllpmbustible, thus desp'oying prpet i c d y d life within its mcb, Citits that were mih away from auch in~r~hriona as Nike-Zm bass which the encmy would try to destroy would k
tlumselvc~wipcd out aa a byproduct. Highways and raihada would bc &
atroyed or made weless, madical supplies would bc destroyed and medical
peaonncl would be killed or disabsd. From multi-megaton bombs that were
tither accidentally or intentiwnliy exploded in the air, m i l k of h n k m a
up to several hundred miIes away would have h blinded. Thus many of
thoec who would be necmary to help the critically i n j d or to H#p order,
mtablish communications and k t rescue operations d d themdm
be h e l p k and requiring attention.
All thh would have occurred within minutes of tk &st thermonuclear
attack. Assumiag a fallout shelter system had betn constructed, millions of
Americans would had for their nearest shelter. Mauy would never make it
h a u s e of fire, immdate high &don,
choked strsets, automob& ~ccidtnm and so on. But millions would get to the d m , m d a t this point the

second factor-the nature of the shelrer program-would cwne into egect.
Much has becn written about the d
y or immorality of p m t q
nugbbors from entering one's own fallout shelter. The dilemma is stpfkly
clwr. Either unauthoriPRd entrants will have to bc t u r d away, or their
presence will bring about their own deaths and t h e of the Icgitimate OCCUpants. A shelter that has been prepared for a two-week stay for five
with the bare survival necessities of food, water, air a d sanitation
amply not suppore 8ix peopk for & stay necessary to avoid & fallout dmger.
But what has not
bsen u n d e r d is that p~~cisely
this same dilemma applies to canmunity shelters. A sheIter p r c p d for 300 pwsons cannot accept more. It will be cxtremdy &cult to keep extra people uut of a
W t e r that bas been built in a public place with public funds, but if ertm
m ~ 1 we
e allowed to enter thev will brine d d with them.
is not easg to ehbetwhen the mhitia Nevertheless, in case of war
the choice will hnvt to be made on the spur of the moment by anyone who
could establish himself as shelter Ieader. Whatever his choice, he will have
camnous dsculty in pernunding all o e c u p t a of t
k Mtutbat he is right,
cgpeeially if ht chooses exclusion and m e of those excluded haw family tits
with &ow admitted. The result will be that from the &st moment of the
stay in the shelter the qwtim of leadership is likely to be hotly and probably
violently d e b a t h d where this ia SO, the prohbility of survival h&
two we& in a lndcrhr or divided shelter is low.
Xle~piretbeEe p m b h in making thdr way to and gming inside a fdmt
shelter, if the civil defense program had been sizable millions of Ametiuns
wwld probably find themseIves inside, bedding down for a two-week stay
untiI the fabut bad ettltd m earth At this point the problem of shelter

rL

life would cause more deaths and e d t i e s . AU the evidence from catastrophe
situations k &at
everybody s d w foa his f d y . Since aImrrst
a11 American fd
am separated during the b y , a daylight attack wwfd
mean b t
of husbands, wives and c&n
would have to decide
whether to stay in their shelters, daperate without knowledge of their families, or to attempt to leave in the hope of seeking thun out. But In attempt
to lcave might d a n g e r not o d y
having but evergone the in the shelter
because of the fdlout outside, unless speciaI and expensive arrangements were
d for *-tight exips. Thus the M r c r leadership might have t o make a
second major decision a b u t permitting departure. A third major ethical
problem would confront the leadership if occupants k a m e violently insane,
or w o k others by screaming in ttaeir nightmam, or grew deliriously sick
Should such "anti-social" unfortunates be repe~fdlydrugged, or killed outright, if drugs were m c c ox absent? h
r every such decision would ind v e mom1 choices so =cult and so basic that opposition wwM be aroused.
Wherever an oppai$m developed, leadership problems would multiply.
Simply cleaning up the shelter from the results of mas diarrhea and nausea
(always tbe first response to disaster) ~ n d
then rationing space, fwd, water,
medical m p p b and access to toilet would require a b r i h t leader, several
W e d lieutenants and complete eoopefatiw. Previous knowledge of the
n m a r y arrangements, the ability to command respect and a feel for &&g
with overwhctning crisis would be absolutely awcntia1 in every shelter leader
md in most of his lieutenants. Any shelter tbat found itself without such a
leader would be unlikely to survive, and a shelter in which there were two
such men might bave di6culties if the two k a m e Iepders of opposing facths. Cantending with such extreme di&cdties, mPny shelters would un-

doubtedly succumb to apathy ar to itratioad vioIence, In many c a w a sociPI
cohpse would interrupt access to air, food, water and sanitation. It could
only be expected tbat many who had gone into the shelters would never
come out.

When they did come out, some might h d the bomb stiU falling. It is
interesting that pmponents of civil defense mume a single thermonuclear
attack fohwed by two weeks of quiet for the radioactive dust w settle, after
whkh it would lx safe to come out of the shelter. It is more likely that
enemy missiles would be aimed and timed before the war to go ofl d-aut*
matically a t s t a g g e d intemals. A government might well do this in order
to be able to threaten furthw attacks (aimed at shelter-ieaving ppdations
on D-plw-14) if a surrender were not forthcoming. Any such possibility
would make grim farce out of alf civil defense p i b i l i t i e .
Nevertheless, Iet us Pssume that for one reason or another tht bomb have
stopped when the food rum out and people h v e tbeir shelten. What would
they come out to? The social fabric of America wouId be ripped to shreds.
Even if food bad been stored Idorehand, a trip to the storage center would
be necmaary co get it. Highways would be bIocEcad, *line
would bave
burned or exploded and railroad tracks would have been torn up by blast; so
it wmld l i m y K neceas;up to walk to get food. Water m a i n s and dam3
would have broben and p d c a t i o n p h t s been abandoned, so that pmcticaIly
no artificial water systems would be working. Most of the available clothing

would have burned or beti contPminafed by f h t . If it had d
y been
muminad, washing w d d m it usable, but without water, washing
would be impossible. If people came out of their shelters into d d wcatbpr,
some kind of heat and housing would lx essential, but most of the housing
would bave been destroyed or contaminated, and fuels wwId h v e hen destroyed or made inaccessible. Disease would be rampant, &ce sewage ]inwould have broken, water would have been polluted and controls over ram
and beta would bave brokeu down. Biological warfare would probably have
added to these natural origins of b.
What of the gwemmenral structure necessary to restore the crucial services? Many d c i a h would have died, and their replacements w w l d be totally
inexperienced. Martial h w woufd nominaily be in effect, but there would
actually be few military 6r
e organizatims intact enough to enforce it.
Nor would help be availab from elsewhere. All of North America and
Europe wodd be in dire straits, and most of the Northern Hemisphere would
be strugghg with a massive dose of falhut. Since American retaliation wodd
have similarly crushed the Soviet Union, neither nation would even be able
to ask for emergency relief from the other in the traditional pattern of the
vanauished suine for the victor's heln.
other work, this catastrophe &odd differ from ~ r a c t i c d yall in the
past in that there would be no social cushion for the injured, the stming, the
b e d , to fall back on. Ahays before, human being in trouble d h~p
for help from other human beings wbo had not been hurt. But after a fullscde thermonuclear war, there would not be enough undamaged ~ i e t i e left
s
to bring the necessary quick aid. The world's least touched populations wmld
b thm in the South- Hemisphere; but thme poples, except for Awtr&
and New Zealand, are also the world's poorest, l e s t able to &ord the ships,
the fwd, the medic4 supplies and personnel, and tbe administrative capacity
necessary t o save American lives and society. As for Australia and 'Mew
Zealand, they are simply too small in population and roo far away to do the
job in the necessary time. The result would be that most of t h e who did
come out of the shelters would die in the next month for lack of the simple
biological necessitiw and of the social system that could bring these necessities
.. . to
. thtm.
The fa& and destruction would extend even beyond the s d sy~temto
the very physical and biologicd environment in which North American man
has lived. Dr. John N. Wolfe, chief of the Environmental Scicnces Branch
of the Atomic Energy Commission, has pointed this out: "Thermal and b h t
eflects, and concomitant radiation, would create vast areas that would be
useless to the survival of man. Add a h fire, k t devastation and d h s e ,
and the picture in many areas becomes grim indeed. Fallout sheltem in such
areas seem only a means of delaying death." Another biologist, Dr. N.Bentley
Glass of the J o h Hoplrins University, bas estimated that after a 7,000megaton attack upon the United States the radioactive soil would be unn&
to produce edible food for five years. Although there are ways of decontpminating such soil, this in itself woufd require work on tbe tnd in WWY SO
bighty xadioactive that the workers would themselvts be killed. In fact, one
scientist from the defense-oriented RAND Corporation told the Houdd
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civil defense hearing that once dl life i dimhated from an area, a pint of
no return is reached at which the h d kmmm too b d e for even
recomuuction.
Thus if one views the A d a n people ond the M o d American continent
as a social and ecological spfm, in which dl the elements are ia.&td
and a heavy blow at all of them makes the recovery of any of them d i k d p ,
one musr cetimatc that a thcrmonuclmr war wwld leave no Americans alive
to mourn on ia &st PMiversary.
So far this analysis haa sugpted that civil defense in in no way an asset
to sumival But is thue any way in which civil defense W act as a Ehwt
to life? Thexe arc r e v 4 psibilitim that &odd bc explored before t
b pmdoxicol propsirion can be a w s d
The mast obvious of t h a e k associated with the version of counter-farce
strategy that iocIudw "'strategic evacuation" to huge underground b h t
Meera It would seem h
r axiomatic that if the Soviet Union had attacked
a major Western interest and had then been confronted with m AmericPn
evacuation of c i v h obvhuplg portending sn dtimarum, the Soviets w d
attack the United States at once, The rtreanu of refugee c i v h would
huwelve-3 constitute the c b r notification of danger and invitation to
attack Tbe attempt a t civil defense would its& have signaled the R
to begin a &tion-dmroying
war. At the snme time, the helplama of
the civilians during the evacuation i d w d makt them more liable to die
in the b t momenta of attack Thus civil defense would have defeated its
own purpose.

The second way in which civil defense might a c ~ U increase
y
the dang#r
lives a & explained by a quotadon from the report of thc
Horiseld Subcommittee on Milit;up Opera*,
Ttae Capnmittee pointed at,
"As we b d d more &ilw
and 'hid i~ to reduce v u l n d t y , tbt
enemy must earmatk bigger n u k paylo& far e d t;uget and cosl~emphte
a larger total *tack This increnses the pomttl f d h t and otber bazamh far
Ehe civilian popuIah" From this forxuStiw the HoMefd Subcommittee
somehow drew the c o n c l u b that civil, defense should be increased, Othm
may be pardoned for concluding that any such increase would merely mggtst
to the enemy that he f w t k increme I& amck level. Thus an attempt at
civil d e f a would bring in
an enemy preparation for a larger attack. As we have just sem proved by the Rwdana, modern technology &=
it easy tu raise the power of thcrmmuch weapons from the 10 or 20-mgoton level to 50 or 100 megatom. It is much more &cult and expensive to
the I d of p-tim
given to civilhns. Tbus civil defense would
alwap be behind in this spiral, and every incmse in civil defense would merely
trigger an even larger
in the attack capability. Xn tbh kind of mot,
people will always be k r s , d the number of deaths will be i n m a d .
a measure for pmtecting American
Civil defense cannot be defended
liva ThermonuckPr war will be m devastating that a t best civil defense will.
only prolong a few &lives for a few wceka or m o n k By the timc the
h t d v e m r y of the war would roll around, those few million Americana
would be just aa dead as if they h d no civil defense a t all. At wmt, some
aspxts of c i d &fcnse rniglu actually increase the toll of e d y d e a h in the
to

immtdinte hours and &ye r r f stack.
~
In any case, Americana cannot depend
on civil dcffnse to prwmt &maelves or their m t r y from dying.

Civil Dsfmse as a Danger to a Free Emmmy
Aa the di&ultia and inndequacics of civil dcfense pre pointed out more
cIPrlp, pmpmts of civil defense react by urging larger and more expeosive
program. I t is &doze relevant ro examine what a larger and larger civil
defcnsc would do to our economy, How would it affect the w d t h and wellbeing of private individuals? What wmId it do to our wet-all economic
growth? What impact would civil defense h e upon free enterprise as
against centralized government control of the sonomy?
Estimates of the a t of civil defense naturally vary according to what
kind of program is being advocated. The imiitence of Administration and
&~~ressiorialproponcnr~of civil defense that p m m t activities are mereIy
a b s t step toward r much k g e i civil defense &oft suggests that the mum
to be spent will wmt;mtly incrmse. The HoWld Subcommittee estimad
that fallout-only heltcrs would c a t about $100 per space and that a f a b i t
p m g m providing orae space for d American would therefore cost about
$20 billion. Tbe Defense Department, h e r , reports that e s h t a of thc
c a t of conutruction of fdout shelm nm from $100 tcr $300
that stocking of the shelter with minimal food and water aupp 'es would run
appmximady mother $41
$61 per apace. Neither of thcst W t w
includes the cmt of supportive meaaurw rmch zp food stomge centers, construction of &breaks, or p m t t a c k education of the population for civil
defense. Nor does the $zo-billion estima* in#e the c a t of constructing mom
thm one shelter apace for each American, dthough the ummmus daily
mobility of America would suggest that
or thm p e e s in Merent
parts of a mmpoIitan prep would bp necessary to meet attacks a t Mmnt
times of thc day and night. If, as the HoMd Sulxommittce suggests, tbe
United Statta should begin to build blast &eltern as well as fallout sheitem,
the costs would be mwmously i n d . There seam no d&
that a
program of vast underground &cItus suitable for stmtegic evacuation would
cost in the mnge of at lerst several hundred billian ddlnrs.
There has been t& that family fallout shelters might cost aa little as $150.
But even a cursory emmination of the kind of shelter that might be built
for five people a t that price shows that it could not be equipped either with
oxygen or with a ventilating system capable of admitting air but weening
out fallout; with fallout-pmf w&, with protection against bre from a
burning house immediately above, and with f d , water, sanitation and
medicine for two weelm, In shore, p h for a cheap family sheltw will.
probably fool not even the pmpcrive builder for h g . Although a family
shelter might rak fewer psychologicat and miological problems tban a community shelter, its cast would rule it out for most American f
w
y
for the 50% of of ppuhtion wbose f d y income is under $frOO. Its vexy
natllie would nJe out apomnent-dwellers. A d , of m,the family shelter,
even if built, could p-t
the whok family only a t night.
For nU thew rrasons, most supportm of civil defense propase that the
Federal government pay directly for the major expenses of pubk shelters

gum-'

a d for aupprtive arrangtmenu Iike food storage a d civil defense tmining,
d that F e d 4 tax incmtiva encowage the privae budding of f d y
buainws shelters. In one form or another, ebt money would come out of
Federal tru reven- or, through ddcit speading, out of in&If the
Irumsy c m directly out of revenue, (aoe oot of r s c i w ) , eithcr mmc
F e d d program 0 t h than civil defense must be c
d or t a x a m ~ bet
increased. If it comw from spseiat tax reductions given m incentives, either
otber taxes must bE jPcmd or 0 t h h~ t i v w efim;nlted I t should be noOcd
that the impct of the t b e of
~m a e y to civil dcfen~ecould n ~btt ~ p m d
over a long time. Even tbe minimal $20 billion suggesosd by rhe W e l d
Sukummitte is aimed a t protection from current w m ~ If. a wapops
revolurion every five y a m is assumed (and that M -tia-g
historysince1945 the$2O-billionspremdbeobsolete by 1966. Inotber
words, the $20
on would h e to be spent in three or four yearn to have
cven one or two years' vdue, and then P new and mow a+vc
civil defa~lt
would have to lx started immediptely.
The impacts of the various budget and revenue psibilitiw must be
examined, If in order to encourage civil defense other tax incentives are
eliminated, the thrust toward greater industrial &mcy and productivity
efwould not even
wilI be d d t r a b l y w#kened. S
fy dots in pouring new m c h
have the by-praduct effect that
taryspending
a d new products into the civilian cwmmy. Thus, by endangering the in-ti- toward higher ptoductivity in privatt entctprk, civil defense might
bring about stagnation in the Ammican econorny iu the face of vigorma
mpccition from memeas.
While it b obviously i m w b l e to soy in advance what segments of the
population w d d be hardest hit by a tax increase for c h d defense or what
segments of the budget w d b hanbt hit
a m f e r of money t o civil
defense, certain results would be fairly lidy. Any general tax increase
wauld bE certain to make molr &cult the st;rres' task of Iiruling money for
the support of cducauon, Coasidtring the precarious condition or @tion
of education in the Federal budget, it is a h likely that o transfer of money
within the Federal budget would be likely to hurt the education appropriation. Since A
h education provide the basic motive p e r in economic
p w t h and the myriad
to keep frsc enocrprist ping, and since American
education is altendy in d&ulty, a Wt of funds from education to civil
&fa
wouId probably have &oua long-run effects. If the
came from
anti-deprtssion szfegumb auch aa uacmpIoyment insurance, the m a y ' s
&cultiea in br&g
out of an economic down-dant could be multiplied.
hdeed, it is &cult to sec how large sums of money could be transferred
over a short period from any productive area of American life to an u n p m
dttct;~tupe like civil defense witbout h w I p damaging the stability and
p r o p of our free-cnterp* economy.
Quite separate from tbe danger of economic flagnation would bt the
danger of centnlizsd governmental control over the economy. A program
aimed at one f h t shelter space for every American would xequirc FederPI
intervention in building regulations, in city plnnning and zoning, in dwtion
of scarce ma&
mi& a prisbable drugs, in loention of new industrial
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k
militvy targets, in d c e and factory training
.procedures in order to insure the d e c t i v m s of civil defense preparatiom
ond in a b
e of other ways through every aook and crznny of the Ammican
economy. h whipping civil defense into sbapc, it w d d not be p d l e to
~
d the e
t m m d c interests or convenience of managanent, labor or
xmaumers, since the over-ridmg criteria would be military, Strict Federal
m g e m e n t wwld be wmtial in order to make sure that civil defense would
rxkt in action, not d
v tm D P ~ .
Let us laok'at what rh; F&A government might have to order a city
to do. Merely to secure fallout shelter epacm, huge excavations throughout
rtae businas and industrid dirtricta would have to be ~lannedfor quick and
lwdy aceas, dug regardless of the necessuy disturbance to normal b u s h ,
and stocked with large, per+icaIly renewed oupplies of food, water, and
medicines. If the civil defense pmgram were
enough to face the
probfem of htorms, tk city would have to be ordered to split itself
into sections divided by huge empty awatcbea of concrete, intended to retard
the p r o w of he. (Thm areas c d be ossd neither as parka nor aa highways, since both mew snd busks and autumotive gasoline would be highly
flammable.) Wherever cmcentratioas of population would make it dScult
for enough shelter apace to be easiry accwaiblc, bnsinand residentid
.arm wwld be f o r d to k t e . W h e families b d t shelters, not merely
the shelter but the distance between it and the bome and the m a h I s used
in building tbe bome wodd have to be FederalIy inspected and controlled,
since P shelter too near a tm flammable house would be no shelter at all.
Apartment houses, both old and new, would be required to include adequate
shelter space fox their tenants. On a number of Mcrent daya thoughout the
year and at diffeient times of day, shelter-t&g &ills wmId be ordered
tithwt notice in order to ttst and train the population. Some drills might
have to exfend over seven1 days in order to train people for h i o g in the
ahelters zs well as getting to them. White m y single w e of these Fed&
interventions might be worked into the pattern of business a d indwtq
without great &culty, the combination of them will demand close Federal
super~isionof the economy to guard against totll economic disruption,
Business relocations, staggering of work hours, temporary shut-downs and
c o m d t y dmntionr would all be Federally domed.
While it would subject a11 private business to intense Federal regulation
h d inspection, tht pmcess of building civil defense wwld preseme a t hast
the forms of private enterprise. Those planners who expect =me Americans
to survive and recuperate fmm a thermonuclear war are looking toward the
~usptnsiorror abolition of even the forms of free enterprise, Some cconomk
studiw of post-attack conditiom suggest that govgovunment would be the only
p s i b l e employer after the war. They argue that government would be
the only instirution able to offer food, clothing, shelter and other necwsitia
in exchange for work, and they point aut that the necessary work would be
construction of such h g e public nseds as trampon, c w n m d c a t i m
and water md amaze mtema
Thus even if private enterprise somehow survived with enwgh ~ C E
to pay d its workers in 4 necemitiea, the government w d have to insist
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on suspension of privare pmjccta in order t o speed up public reconstruction..
For at least the period of p t - n t ~ kemergency, thc onIy employ= would;
be the State and every citizen would be DTM
to do its work. Thc histoy
of even partid nathmhatim of industry suggests that it would be exuunely
diBicdt, after m r a f pars of total nationalization, to bring about n re-.
to private en-k
Thus, men on the mast hopeful predictions of sup
porters of civil defense, after a thermonudear war a large proportion of
Americans would have been killed and the rest would be working in a quasi-.
Communist economy.
It may be questioned whether tbis nation could h g endure hdf h d
and half Red.
Civil Defense IW ti Dmger t o Political Freedom
Not only free enterprise in the American economy but the political liberties
of America and of orha nations wouid suffer constriction under the n m i ties of civil defense, Overseas, the constriction would come at second h a d ,
Concentration on civil defense wodd make much more drfliculc the granting
of American aid to young and struggling democracies, which need the aid in
order to make economic progress without dictatorship. The hrsc small step
in this process l
m already been t a b , with the assignment of cer&
food
stocks ro civil defense storage centers in the United Staces instead of to Food
for Peace grants overseas. As the civil defense program gains momentum,
it wilt become necessary to set aside more and mare f d , medicine, construction tooh and development funds for building and stocking the shehers.
Not only wiII such an inarruption or reduction in aid damage the chances
of democracy overseas, but the general implications of an American civil
defense program might w d arom ktensc anger in the underdeveloped world.
To uncommitted and underdeveloped nations, an Amcrican civil defense
effort would look like a s e b h attempt to save our own population from the
eaeets of great-power fouy in unleashing atomic war. Those parts of Asia,
Africa, and Latin Auurica that would be heavily affected by pout-war
f a h t would see themselva as h e a t victims of such a war, unable to
d o r d the enormom eEorts that would be necessary to protect their own
people. For this reason, on American &YI
defense program might amuse the
same kind of antagonism in the new nations that the testing of the H-bombs
has aroused among them. Such antagonism would further hurt American
chances of exercising political leadenhip among the new nations and would
therefore damage the chances of political democracy in the uncommitred world.
A t home in America, civil defense will have an evcn more direct and
dangerous impact upon
liberties, In c&ct, not merely young men
but all Americans would be made conscriptir in an army under Pentagon
control. A program that impinges upon every facet of social and
life can scarcely do otherwise. Already one local political leader in the
suburbs of Washington, D,C.,has demanded that family sheiten be made
cornphry, on the ground that any family's failure to build a shelter would
weaken tbe national military posture. As civil defense picks up steam, such
comments are sure to be multiplied. With the whole Federal government

rooking the & the prsmre would

soon be put on "'slackers" in much the
fashion it w a during World War 1 upw people who failed to p r c b c
p-ly
"wluntarp" Liberty k i d s .
Nor would this be d.Failure, because of apathy or abjection, to take
part in compuhry civil defense drills would be thought a dangerou~to
the community aa fdure to take part in vaccination programs (because for
the drills to succeed, teamwork wodd be absolutely necesslry). New York
has h d y armfed and jailed non-participants, On a larger scale, thm
might be the danger tbat an entire state would decide civil defense was not
worth disrupting its Iife and =fuse to enact the necessary local Iaws and
regulatioar. Would the U p i d Statw Government permit mch a dangerow
gap in i~ prepamtima to continue? If not, how c o d the intimate
of civil defense be i m p d without practically putting the state into
political receivership?
Nor wwld overt action against civil defea~ebe the ody problem. Pubk
criticism of civil d e f m would bave the same deleterious dect that ctiticigm
from the ranks would bave upon the m o d of an army on the 4
Attempting to argue against civil defense would probably be equated with
encouraging a dmftddger. In other words, the i m p t i v e m i t y for
d v c r s a l d o r t if civil defense were even to seem practical might impel a
government committed to civil defense to m p p m borh opposition to the
progrlm a
d failure to join in it.
of their liberties redud.
Even supporters of civil defense would have
In an attempt to protect many kinds of civil d e f m centers from sabotage
or attack, the loeations and purpabes of such
as food smmg d e p y
emergency government headquamrs or factories producing g d s crucial
m the post-aruck emergency would have to be kt secret. Travel nmr rmch
places and press reporting a b u t them would have m be carefully m w i d
by the Federal government. Thege strictures apply now, of course, to m i l i t q
installations, but the point is tbat civil defense installadons would be far
more numerous and far more widely scattered through the country, and
restrictions would therefore be far more onerous.
Them would be other pressures, more subtle but just as real, upon the
fabric of American political liberty. Our liberty and in fact our nationid
unity is built upon a web of assumptions about each other as citizens and
people-assumprim we rarely notice because we practically never question
them. But already the mere beginnings of civil defense have Ied to loud
threats from Nevada to shoot down "invading" Californians, to unpublicized
but uneasy questions about racial segregation or integration in fallout shelters,
and t o angry remarb about the expendability of city residents as against
suburban or country folk. The question of survivaI, because it involves b t h
the most i n b a perswa1 dispitions and the most pressing national conflicts, will inevitably divide Americans far more sharply than we bave ever
known. Making concrete decisions about civil defense will rub our old
divisions to the raw.
Fiaally, it should be pointed out thar many who believe some Amexicam
can survive a thermonuelclr war do not believe that democracy can sumive
the war. The mast conshnt and outspoken Congressional supporter of civil

~ ~ c k t ~ , h a a s ~ # d t h a t h e r c c ~ " t h e r
wilI ba d law a b t hvitably," Congressmnn Wllinm Fitts Ryan

has wondtred whether, if any Amcricam sumive, the United Statts w d d
everagainbem~tmtion-ore~enwhetficritwouldbtasin~
nation or wlit inm component parta m t t d by wide areas of radioactivity.
Thw even t h e who hope that civil defense might save liva have no illwihm
about the dip&
mtlmk for pliticd liberty after a tbermonuclePr war.

Tbe T w t k lid Mau
Analyzing a!l the fac- of civil defense h w a that it would tend to nuke
tharmonucley war more likely, could not reduce the roll of lmes from such
a war but might even increase tk immediaEp of death, w d s u i d y slow
h a American economic growth and d
d gravely damage both political
and d
c k y . Civil defense would incrclsc the c
b that k r i c a
would in im kt years k o m e a "Red" h t y and would then die anyway
uadw thermonuclear attack.
The dangers and inadequacy of civil defense h l d be no surprise. Human
beings have always had before tbem the object feason of the turtle, which
adopted a civil defense policy millenia ago and has k e n unable to progress
ever since. The price for the o n e - t u d b h t shelter has been stagnation in
an evolutionary backwater.
W s ;mceptwrs tmk & other path. Stripping d every static defense
against the other a n i d , man hns competed with his wits and his hibility.
Man is soft and naked and the turtle h98 P hard protective shell, but mankind
has made the turtle into a tasty dish. Frabdom has its uses as weU as its joy&
Whac then would be a "humanaaplicy, a frep man's policy, on civil
defense? The &st requirement should be frankness. The President should
-plain clearly to the American people that the nature of thermonuclear
makes the death of a l l Americans and olI Russians highly probable
gen=nudear
war s b d d come. IL should exp& rhac civil defense is
therefore &as.
And be s h o d publicly vlllMlnce the abandonment of the
civil defense program.
Having got rid of one major aspect of tht countet-force strategy, he should
then scrap all American weapons and p h tdored to a counter-force or &ststrike strategy. H2 should point out t o the R u s k s , while doing so, that this
act would give any Russian civil defense program a provocative appearance.
He shouId also explain that civil defense is as urn& tic in terms of physical
survival in Russia as in the Unitd Stam.*
And he should publicly acbowIedge that in scrapping its first-strike
capability while still psmsing its retaliatory weapons, the United States waa
*

l?lue k n vigorom debace o w whether the Swiet Uniw now hnr t miour civil d c f w
program The evidancu iadiwtts that whiile the Soviets have aaincd rhdr p~pulacioa in
many civildefense rc~huiqw,sbc necernv physical gnpuntionr have nor been made, For
examplr, no failour rhdtm &t in Soviet apanmrnt b o w Rdermccs w aubwayr ar
ddtm ignora l l ~ fo d y dm sbof f d md d d aock, bunk d maw toilcr frciIibut tb liLdihPod t h a t cha H-bomb h b d l would m p o h the subways w ram t h e
p p k in them. R w + h dim*
for v c y p h t a gathering of f d a d laitcr and
even aergcncy rbclttt-digging an keytd to rbe wa*
tima of slow bombers, not of
modern miwik.

Eft with the radiation implications of thme weapons ntld b e the United
Smm would thus bt assuming, in effect if mt in incent, a stable dewrent stratem.
Th ~ G d e n should
t
further explain that the stable deterrent, w h e k
m d y implied w A i a l l y adopd, would be uaeful in t
k h g run onfy as
a bridge toward disarmament, h c e tcehwbgkal progress will ~ ~ l n or
c r
htw " d e s t a W the simaticm by giving thermonuchr wapons to more
narioas and by breaking through the inwfnugbility of 4 - s a i k t
weapons like Poluis.
Tftc President should then tell the S&
Union that we would never
be the f b t to use rhe H-bomb. The a i n k t y of this statement w d have
been demonstrated in the repudiation of avil defense and the mpping of
&st-strike weapons, a safe beginning for and a catalyst to a disarmament
pmcms. As for the "stable" titterrent strategy which would be a t this point
mum& from Ameficm w e a p capab;l;ty, it would not be necessary or
advisable for the President to comment yet. Nor would ir be r e ~ w a b f e
for Fhe Preidene to repeat old b t s of retaliation, since the threaw are
implied in the weapons themselves and dncc he should be attempting to
improve the c h a f e for disarmament negoeiah,
Having explained the modern facts of dm& to both muons, the President
shouId urge the Soviet Union to follow suit in abolishing civil defense and
repudiating
- - counter-forcestrategy, backing up its repudiation with a scrapping of first-strike weapons.
In any case the U p i d States would abolish its own civil ddellse as a
futile expense likely to force stagnation nnd coercion u p n us.
Our initiatives in abandoning counter-force strategy and abolishing c i d
defense would greatly improve the atmosphere for negotiation toward disarmament under inspection and controL But our lack of scientific knowledge
a b u t the p r e r e q ~ ~ t efor
s disarmament and our constitutional limits on
presidential power in achieving disarmament w d make it necessary for
Congress to understand and nit u p n the new Jtwtion.
To begin with, Congress could tiansf- the useless funds at present in the
civil defense budget to the new Arms Contd and ]Disarmament Agency$300 million to use for such research in the socid and na-1
sciences as
would apply t o negotiating, achieving and preserving disarmament. A massive injection of restarch funds, as Americans have found in the fields of
military defense, medicine and agricultural productivity, is likely to pay
amazing dividends; we should try it in the field of disarmament. The money
now being wasted in civil defeast provides an obvious and appropriate source
of funds, since in t h e long run the only effective civil defense is likeIy to be

-

the elimination of the H-bomb.
Finally, one of the most appealing elemenfs of eiviI defense should be
made applicable to more worthwhile and practical means of defending
liberty. Civil defcnse would give every citizen t h e feeling that he himself,
as an individual, is taking action against the threats of tyranny and extinction.
That the m e t M being used is unworkable does not mean that the feeling
of personal participation is valueless. The President and Congras should ask
those Americam who had considered putting time Md d o r t and money into

building

f d y shelter to put that same time, effort a d money inro the
of hlxrty. The Peace Corps is a short step in this &don,
but the idea could be put to use in orher leas drastic ways. Thw are the
kinds of programs that arc needed:
A maja Presidential campaign (like that recently devoted to civa dcf ense)
enwuraging the giving of such perm-m-person economic and technical aid
as a CARE package of farm tooh
Free postage for individual mailin to Asians and Africans of controv~~siaf
and stimulating American used boo and magazines.
Federally financed teaching ta American tourists of the spoke21 language of
one major Communist or uuwmmitted nation they were planning to visit.
Tax deductions for private cont~utiomto the United Nations (and
perhaps to other international organizations such as NATO and t h e Organization of American States).
Partial government support for family one-ywr "adoptio~~s"of children
frwn overseas, especially from Communist and uncommitted states.
Federal provision of imporrant Russian, Chinese and other foreignIanguage publications to private citizens quahied and willing to transla#
them for u r by scholars, scientists and foreign policy experts.
AIl these substitutes for c i d defense wauld quicken and diversify, rather
than slow down and cmtralizc, the American economy. All of them would
encourage rdm than suppm American individuabm and the m e volunteer
spirit of frcc men. AiI of them would make less likely, not more, the onset
of thermonuclear war. They would k worthy and effective h m m w e a p o w
based on inreliigence a d 0exiWty-rather
than the heavy, hampering
defense sought by the turtle.
PoXticaUy, a reversal of present Administration policy on civil defense
might: be impractical. Powerful grwps wirhin the Pentagon md major political figures outside the Administration are demanding a stronger civil d e f w
and wotlld certainly fight an abandonment of it. But if the wiU to reverse
policy exists, a political way can be found. Congressman Ryan haa proposed
that a special congressional committee, not committed to supporting civil
defense, reexamine the whole policy fmm top t o bottom. Such a reevaluation
mighr provide the public understanding on which m inteuigent decision
about civil defense a u l d be b a d . So might a public explanation by the
President of the long-range implications of the Soviet $0-megaton bnmb.
Other ways might be found.
But somehow, before it is too late, the American peopIe must lcarn tbis:
There are no fronriers--old or new--underground In the thermonuclear age,
there am no defea~esunderground, either.
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